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Raoul Berger's Fourteenth
Amendment: A History or
Ahistorical?
STANLEY I. KUTLER*
Introduction
Raoul Berger's scholarship of the past decade has substantially in-
fluenced and enriched our understanding of American constitutional-
ism. His readers are not limited to legal and historical academicians;
the timeliness of his work has often contributed to important public
debates as well as to constitutional scholarship.' In his latest effort,
Government by Judiciary,2 Berger offers an impassioned critique of and
assault upon what he regards as the judicial perversion of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Acting on his longstanding suspicion of judicial power,3 Berger
has scoured the congressional debates on the Amendment to find,
among other things, that the framers did not intend to address the
question of school segregation,4 that they did not intend to interfere
with state control over voting rights,5 and that in general they did not
intend that the Amendment should incorporate the Bill of Rights.6 The
purpose and intentions of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Berger concludes, do not justify the Court's activism of the last several
decades, which has resulted in judicial policymaking involving desegre-
* Professor of History, University of Wisconsin. Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1960.
Russell Sige Residency in Law and Social Science, University of Wisconsin, 1967-68.
1. See R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE. A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974); R.
BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973) [hereinafter cited as
BERGER IMPEACHMENT]. See also R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969).
2. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY].
3. Cf BERGER, IMPEACHMENT, su.pra note 1, at ch. III. For criticism on this point, see
Kutler, Impeachment Reconsidered, I REVS. IN Am. HIsT. 480-87 (1973).
4. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 177-233 (ch. 7).
5. Id at 52-68 (ch. 4).
6. Id at 134-56 (ch. 8).
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gation7 and reapportionment,' and the judicial management of institu-
tions ranging from Denver public schools9 to mental hospitals in
Alabama."°
Berger's work attempts to revive a relatively stagnant stream of
commentary. From the early twentieth century through the late 1930s,
academic and liberal commentators, as well as groups such as orga-
nized labor, criticized vigorously the abusive powers of the federal judi-
ciary. They accused judges, particularly those on the Supreme Court,
of consistently frustrating desirable social policies, allegedly sanctioned
by popular sentiment. Scholars and critics thus created the well-
known, perjorative (and exaggerated) slogans of the time such as "Gov-
ernment by Judiciary" and "Judicial Supremacy."" The point made
by the critics was that the judges had arrogated a policymaking func-
tion-not conferred upon them by the Constitution. Moreover, critics
argued, this exalted judicial role negated the basic principles of repre-
sentative government. Judges, in short, were considered to be Platonic
Guardians who thwarted the popular will and the national well-being
in favor of the interests of a privileged few.12
What was to be done? There were periodic demands for the out-
right abolition of judicial review or for cosmetic changes in the prac-
tice, such as requiring a two-thirds or unanimous vote of the Supreme
Court to invalidate legislation or allowing Congress to override a judi-
cial determination of invalidity. None of these suggestions proved po-
litically feasible or even desirable. Louis B. Boudin's 1932 work,
Government by Judiciary, offered a powerful critique of the times, as-
saulting the abuses as well as the premises of judicial power. At the
outset, Boudin noted that many prominent liberals, while accepting the
validity of his analysis, despaired of any tangible results. Their posi-
tion, he contended, could be reduced to a simple formula: "We must
7. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland.County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S.
440 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 368 (1964);
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
10. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M. D. Ala. 1972), ajfdsub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
11. See L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932); R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE
FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941).
12. For a representative example of this view, see R. JACKSON, supra note 11. See also
W. ELLIOT, THE RISE OF A GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY (1974).
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pray-and occasionally argue-for good men in the seat of power."' 3
And so liberals prayed and argued for "good men" on the courts. One
wonders if Franklin D. Roosevelt's judicial appointments from 1937 to
1943 empirically demonstrated the existence of God to such liberals.
In time, however, the judges changed, and, accordingly, so did
conceptions of the judicial role. After 1937, most of the judiciary's
longtime critics suddenly found a new faith and promoted it with all
the zealousness of new converts. Eugene V. Rostow epitomized the
new concept neatly in his article, The Democratic Character of Judicial
Review.14 Rostow matched a new libertarianism promoting "preferred
freedoms" as enumerated in the Bill of Rights with an activist judiciary
to protect those values. The judges themselves pointed the way of the
true faith as they rationalized a minimal judicial role for superintend-
ing economic legislation while championing civil rights and civil liber-
ties to the maximum. 5
The New Deal Justices soon warmed to their broadened task.
Franklin D. Roosevelt's Attorney General, Robert H. Jackson, pub-
lished a classic liberal account of historical judicial abuses shortly
before being named to the Court in 1941.16 Jackson applauded the new
sense of judicial restraint regarding economic legislation and the
Court's emerging role as a palladin for civil liberties. For Jackson,
there was no conflict:
Ordinarily, legislation whose basis in economic wisdom is uncer-
tain can be redressed by the processes of the ballot box or the
pressures of opinion. But when the channels of opinion and of
peaceful persuasion are corrupted or clogged, these political cor-
rectives can no longer be relied on, and the democratic system is
threatened at its most vital point. In that event the Court, by
intervening, restores the processes of democratic government; it
does not disrupt them. 7
13. L. BouDiN, supra note 11, at ix.
14. 66 HARv. L. Rnv. 193 (1952).
15. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), wherein Justice
Harlan F. Stone articulated the new premise that his colleagues subsequently elaborated.
Justice Stone commenced by stating that "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commer-
cial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts
made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption
that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legisla-
tors." Id at 152 (footnote omitted). He then observed: "There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." Id at
152-53 n.4.
16. R. JACKSON, supra note 11.
17. Id at 285.
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The Warren Court applied this philosophy in a decade and a half
of result-oriented jurisprudence which witnessed the crumbling of
sometimes century-old precedents and the charting of new political and
social goals that long had been proscribed by entrenched, self-protec-
tive interests. The new path of judicial review even led the Court into
realms of substantive values hardly imagined by Stone or Jackson, such
as birth control'" and abortion. 19 But the liberal chorus of support was
generally warm and a sense of smug self-satisfaction prevailed in such
circles; the Warren Court was approvingly described by one observer
as the "keeper of the national conscience."2"
There were those, however, who did not see the Warren Court as
judicial messiahs. Southern politicians molding political careers
through support of segregation, state legislators insisting they repre-
sented more than cows and trees, and police and prosecutors promoting
societal rights as superior to those of the criminally accused all cried
"judicial usurpation." And the John Birch Society peddled its Impeach
Earl Warren Kits. Occasionally, liberal veterans of the old battles com-
plained that the applause for the new dispensation was dangerously
uncritical. Their essential message, based on atavistic suspicions ofju-
dicial power, warned that social policy, however desirable, could not-
and should not-be achieved by judges alone. Moreover, judges come
and go, as do prevailing judicial fashions; what judges do, they can
undo. In the meantime, conservatives must have been praying hard.
Richard Nixon promised deliverance from judicial evil, and he deliv-
ered Warren Earl Burger so succeed Earl Warren. God does indeed
work in mysterious ways.
I. The History
Now comes Raoul Berger. In a rich and detailed yet polemical
and prolix analysis, Berger has sought to determine the goals and inten-
tions of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. He finds not a
scintilla of historical support for the Supreme Court's decisions on de-
18. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (zone of privacy created by
penumbras of fundamental constitutional guaranties extends to the intimacies of married
life involving contraceptives). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
19. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (constitutional right of privacy encompasses
a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973).
20. Lewis, Historical Change in the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1962, (Maga-
zine), at 7 (cited in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 73. 79, 81 (L. Levy ed.
1972)).
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segregation,2' reapportionment,22 or the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights.23 The scholarship of Charles Fairman and Alexander Bickel,24
and the decisions of Justices Felix Frankfurter and the second John
Marshall Harlan, suggest that this is hardly new. Instead, Berger at-
tempts to demonstrate that the Amendment's reach was limited to
questions of racial discrimination, as delineated in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.25
Not only is Berger largely unoriginal in his effort,26 he really does
not successfully confront the reconstruction of the setting of the Four-
teenth Amendment propounded in the works of scholars such as Har-
old M. Hyman,27 Howard Jay Graham,28 Michael Les Benedict, 29
Alfred H. Kelly,3" and Leonard Levy,3" to name only a few. These
writings show that the history surrounding the origins of the Amend-
ment is complex and deeply immersed in a context of intra-party, per-
sonal and ideological conflicts-all of which led to confusion,
deception and even to a deliberate muting of differences. Berger, how-
ever, ignores all this. He exhibits little sensitivity to contexts (other
than racism), alternatives, and the need to work out solutions in a pro-
gressive, piecemeal fashion. The "black letters" of the Congressional
Globe are a literal revelation to him; significantly, he abstains from
using any other sources.
The scholarly reconstruction of the history of the 1860s has been
one of the most exciting, fruitful endeavors in American historical writ-
ing in the last two decades.32 A variety of conflicting interpretations
21. See note 4 supra.
22. See note 5 supra.
23. See note 6 supra.
24. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1955); Fairman, Does The Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
25. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
26. See note 24 supra.
27. H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION (1973); THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS AND
RECONSTRUCTION: 1861-1870 (H. Hyman ed. 1967).
28. H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT, THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY," AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
(1968).
29. M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1975).
30. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered- The Segregation Question, 54
MICH. L. REv. 1049 (1956).
31. L. LEvY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1972);
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT (L. Levy ed. 1967).
32. Some of the more important works are W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CON-
GRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1963); L. & J. COX, POLrrICS, PRINCIPLE, AND
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has emerged, but there is a consensus that the political behavior and
postures of the participants were as complex and contradictory as the
issues themselves. Berger, however, never hesitates to wade into the
Amendment's cloudy legislative history to isolate individuals and their
statements and accordingly place them within a simplistic radi-
cal/moderate dichotomy. The Republican party of the 1860s was a
cornucopia of factions-radical, moderate, conservative-with varying
extremes in each of those categories.33 Berger nonetheless offers scant
respect for the complexities of political arrangements.
From his elaborate effort, Berger concludes that federal judges in
general, and the Supreme Court in particular, have usurped power to
promote values of their own choice, resulting in "government byjudici-
ary." This conclusion is buttressed by a rigidity of analysis that ignores
inescapable realities of governmental and social processes. For exam-
ple, Berger flatly rejects any notions of constitutional change and
growth-of history, in short-through means other than constitutional
amendment.34 John Marshall's famous dicta that "it is a constitution
we are expounding," which was "intended to endure for ages to
come," 35 simply seem to have no standing with Berger. Fairman and
Bickel largely followed Frankfurter and Harlan in their notions ofjudi-
cial restraint,36 but all four men would have had difficulty in submit-
ting to Berger's constitutional straitjacket.
Unlike other historical and legal commentators, Berger finds the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment neither elusive nor
inconclusive. His research is grounded exclusively in the published de-
bates of the thirty-ninth Congress, the words of which he accepts
throughout his work in absolutely literal fashion. Certainly, anyone
who has worked in this area would acknowledge great respect for the
quality of the debates, as the reports present parliamentary encounters
and rationales in extraordinary form. Nevertheless, because the men of
the thirty-ninth Congress engaged in their share of sham, deception,
planned legislative colloquies37 and even humor, one should be cau-
PREJUDICE, 1865-1866 (1969); D. DONALD, THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION (1965); E.
McKITRCK, ANDREW JomNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1961). For more extensive bibli-
ographies, see A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1125-28 (4th ed.
1970); S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS, 169-73 (1968).
33. See Mendelson Essay at -.
34. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 283-99 (ch. 15).
35. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323 (1819) (emphasis added).
36. See note 24 supra.
37. A planned legislative colloquy is designed, as one congressman has written, "for the
express purpose of providing a legislative interpretation of a statutory provision which might
otherwise be interpreted .... It may be used to overcome legal, parliamentary, or political
[-Vol. 6:511
tioned against a literal reading of their words. Remarks made during
the course of those debates were not always designed to clarify propos-
als for future historians or the judiciary; they were often calculated to
serve a congressman within his own constituency or to further his
party's immediate purposes.
Berger proceeds from the view that the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended merely to "constitutionalize" the Civil Rights Act of
1866.38 As for legislative purposes beyond that goal, he insists there
were none.3 9 The 1866 law prohibited discrimination in civil rights or
immunities on account of race; it provided that the "inhabitants of
every race" would have the same right "to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold and convey real and personal property;" and it established that
such persons would be entitled to the full and equal benefit of laws and
proceedings "for the security of person and property, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment."4 The legislative history of the 1866 Act, as
well as its later incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, demon-
strates that supporters and opponents alike insisted that these words
had nothing to do with political or social rights such as voting, serving
on juries, or attending integrated schools. Democratic opponents
maintained that efforts to bring about such equality were perfectly idle;
blacks, they repeated ad nauseum, must be kept in subordination to
whites. Many midwestern Republican congressmen acknowledged
similar negrophobic sentiments on the part of their constituents, and
therefore usually intoned that they sought only equality in civil rights,
as enumerated in the language of the 1866 law.4"
The making of the Fourteenth Amendment, Berger continues,
generally forced Republicans into even more stringent explanations of
their limited goals. For example, the Amendment's proponents repeat-
edly explained that section 1 contained nothing that could be construed
as endorsing the right of blacks to vote. Time and again, they invoked
notions of state sovereignty and said that only the states could fix the
qualifications for voting. Berger also observes that section 2 of the
Amendment, which provided for reduced congressional representation
when states "denied" or "abridged" the right to vote,42 did not violate
obstacles." Moorhead, A Congressman Looks at the Planned Colloquy and Its Effect in the
Interfpretation of Statutes, 45 A.B.A.J. 1314, 1316 (1959).
38. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
39. See generalo GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 20-36 (ch. 2).
40. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 3, 14 Stat. 27.
41. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 30-31.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 provides: "Representatives shall be apportioned
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that fundamental premise.43
There are alternative ways of reading the words of section 2. To
establish congressional acknowledgement that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not interfere with the states' prerogatives, Berger cites one
leading Republican after another, ranging from conservatives such as
James R. Doolittle," to moderates such as William Pitt Fessenden,45 to
radicals such as Thaddeus Stevens. 6 Yet their own words regarding
the interpretation of section 2 negate that premise, for the Republicans
acknowledged the reduced representation principle to be a remedial
provision permitting national action against a state which Congress
could not otherwise punish directly. In short, Berger's devotion to liter-
alness has led him to ignore the legislative convolutions, indeed sar-
casm, conveyed by such language.
Consider, for example, Berger's approving quotation of Congress-
man Stevens. The Pennsylvanian repeated the litany that "the States
have the right. . . to fix the elective franchise," and that section 2 did
nothing to alter that.47 But the wily Stevens was at his cleverest when
he said that he preferred section 2 to a direct declaration for black suf-
frage because he would rather that blacks not vote until they had been
educated in "their duties. . . as citizens."48 Stevens thus had the best
of all worlds: he could make a gesture to northern bigotry by sug-
gesting that blacks were not ready for suffrage, and he could erode
southern white power in Congress either by reducing representation
based on a denial of the franchise to blacks or by indirectly forcing the
states to let them vote.
Berger's failure to manifest any feel for political context or nuance
is also evident in his interpretation of the congressional attitude toward
blacks. He repeatedly states that many white Americans harbored
among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members
of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State."
43. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 60-68.
44. Id at 62-63, 66.
45. Id at 62.
46. Id at 62, 67.
47. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 536 (1866) [hereinafter cited as GLOBE], quoted
in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 67.
48. GLOBE, supra note 47, at 536, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 67.
[Vol. 6:5 11
Spring 1979] EGRSFUTET MNMN
strong negrophobic sentiments. That, of course, is indisputable, but it
does not fully explain how and why the Amendment was adopted in its
final form.4 9 In Congress, Democrats desperately tried to embarrass
their opponents, a move which, in turn, forced tactical verbal retreats
and apologies from the Republicans. But the Republican preference
was clear: they desired political equality, but accepted the necessity for
moderation. For example, William Pitt Fessenden, certainly a moder-
ate Republican as well as an extraordinarily able leader, repeatedly
genuflected toward state control over the suffrage. He supported the
section 2 principle, however, saying that if the states use their constitu-
tional power to "make an inequality of rights," then they would "suffer
such and such consequences."50 James Garfield wanted suffrage guar-
anteed, but said "I am willing. . . to take what I can get"' I and sup-
ported section 2. Not long afterward, the Republicans had enough
political clout in Congress and in three-fourths of the states to secure
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment.52 That measure was designed
to guarantee black voting rights in the northern states in order to fur-
ther Republican party fortunes.53 The foregoing underscores the con-
tention that legislative history must be viewed as more than a frozen
section of tissue; there also is, to repeat, a context of action, purpose,
and pacing to be understood.
II. Judicial Activism
To demonstrate that modern Supreme Court decisions on school
desegregation, voting, and incorporation of the Bill of Rights conflict
with a monolithic, irresistible history, Berger carefully culls out every
legislative statement dealing with those areas. The ultimate perversion
of the original intentions, as Berger sees it, has been the judicial use of
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. For judicial activists in the late nineteenth century, the due proc-
49. See Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment,
1950 Wis. L. REV. 479, 479-507, 610-61 (1950).
50. GLOBE, supra note 47, at 1279, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 65.
51. GLOBE, supra note 47, at 2462, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 67. Note
also similar remarks by Representatives Roscoe Conkling and John Farnsworth. Id. See
generally W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIF-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1965).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XV provides in part: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." See generally J. MATHEW, LEG-
ISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1909).
53. See generally W. GILLETTE, supra note 51; Avins, he Ffteen Amendment andLiter-
acy Tests: The Original Intent, 18 STAN. L. REV. 808 (1966).
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ess clause served as the cutting edge for the protection of economic
privilege; in our time, the equal protection clause has served judges
who wish to further civil rights and liberties. But the framers in 1866,
Berger contends, in no way intended these phrases as tools for judicial
policymaking. From their words, he deduces a trinity theory whereby
the equal protection and due process clauses are adjectival media for
securing civil rights ("privileges or immunities") against state action:
the equal protection clause bars statutory discrimination, while due
process prohibits judicial discrimination. 4
Berger's certitude is once again troublesome. Underlying his anal-
ysis is a traditional assumption that the Republicans of the era instinc-
tively distrusted the judiciary and, what is more, constantly schemed to
debilitate or destroy its functions. 5 Those expressing such views seem-
ingly dominate the reports in the Congressional Globe-but only in ver-
biage. The record of results is absolutely clear: nothing of substance
was done either to temporarily or permanently cripple federal judicial
power. 6 Senator Charles Summer succeeded in delaying an appropri-
ation for commissioning a bust of Taney for the Supreme Court li-
brary. Some triumph; some limitation. In truth, the Republicans of
this era actively promoted new courts and, above all, new jurisdictional
authority. They viewed the judiciary as a desirable prize in their con-
stant struggle for political aggrandizement; they staved off attempts to
destroy or limit judicial review. More significantly, the accretive force
of habeas corpus, admiralty, bankruptcy, and removal legislation from
1862 to 1865 constituted a virtual revolution affecting the potential fed-
eral judicial power-a potential envisioned by the Federalists long ago
in the 1790s and aborted by the Jeffersonians in 1802.17 Furthermore,
without subscribing to the crass conspiracy notions of Roscoe Conk-
ling,58 it can be argued that the Republican framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment "may have foreseen" the judicial activism of a later period
54. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 220.
55. Id at 223, 385.
56. See generally S. KUTLER, supra note 32, at ch. 5.
57. See generall H. HYMAN, supra note 27; S. KUTLER, supra note 32, at ch. 5; Wiecek,
The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 333, 340
(1969).
58. For an examination of Conkling's now discredited thesis, see Boudin, Truth and
Fiction about the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 19 (1938); Graham, The
"Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938); Graham, The
"Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938). See also au-
thorities cited in A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 32.
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stemming from "the possibilities of their language."59
The Supreme Court of this period was not exactly paralyzed by
the so-called "self-inflicted wound" of the Dred Scott decision." The
terse language of Exparte Yerger,61 the feeble congressional response
to Exparte McCardle62 the quantum leap in cases invalidating federal
statutes,63 and the increasing scrutiny of state public policy all testify to
a rather healthy, ambulatory federal judiciary. Although Berger advo-
cates a narrowly defined view of the Court's function, he does not reject
judicial review of legislation. He instead reiterates the view expressed
in an earlier work that articles III and VI of the Constitution recognize
such power.' But he insists that the power was confined to the "polic-
ing of [constitutional] boundaries and [excluded from] policymaking
reserved to the legislature."6 Thus, policymaking is outside the pale of
the judicial role, and Berger offers no quarter for those who would ask
him to acknowledge the realities of practice. "Usurpation," he says, "is
not legitimated by repetition."66
Such stem aphorisms notwithstanding, there is an abstract artifici-
ality in distinguishing between' "policing boundaries" and "policymak-
ing." In the early decision of Fletcher v. Peck,67 the Marshall Court
59. J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 227-28 (1950).
See S. KUTLER, supra note 32, at 168 n.26.
60. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
61. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
62. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). Following the Court's acceptance ofjurisdiction in the
MeCardle case, Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868), Congress repealed one
limited form of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Justices acknowledged that
they lacked jurisdiction as stipulated by McCardle's lawyers. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1869). The second ruling is usually interpreted as an indication of the congres-
sional Republicans' vindictiveness and the Court's cowardice or impotence. A reading of
Chief Justice Salmon Chase's opinion in the second case clearly dispels such notions. In
closing, Chase directed his remarks directly to McCardle's attorneys, and indirectly to Con-
gress: "Counsel seems to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing act. . . that the
whole appellate power of the court in cases in habeas corpus is denied. But this is an error."
Id at 515. The repealed measure excepted only appeals emanating from the Act of Febru-
ary 5, 1867. The Yerger case, Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869), underlined the
importance of Chase's remarks, for in that case, the Court noted that its habeas corpus
jurisdiction, extending back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, and even the Habeas Corpus Act of
Charles 11 (1660), remained intact. Id at 95-98. The Court's vitality is clearly evident in
these opinions; what is more, Congress accepted the Yerger ruling with barely a whimper of
protest. See S. KUTLER, supra note 32, at 77-88.
63. See cases collected in S. KUTLER, supra note 32, at 114 n.l.
64. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 351-62 (ch. 19). See R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE
SUPREME COURT 236-344 (1969).
65. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 362.
66. Id at 352.
67. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See P. MAGRATH, YAzoo: LAW AND POLITICS IN
THE NEW REPUBLIC (1966); Kutler, Review Essay, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 391 (1967).
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found that Georgia had overstepped the boundaries of state power and
thereby violated the Constitution's contract clause. Such a conclusion
involved much more than policing a constitutional boundary: the
judges unmade a state policy, provided a new one, and enunciated a
wholly new dimension to the contract clause. More recently, the deter-
mination of constitutional boundaries in United States v. Nixon6" re-
sulted in significant policymaking in a long-avoided area-that of
separation of powers. Whichever way the Court ruled in that case, it
would have made "policy" regarding executive privilege. Such exam-
ples are legion. The point is that policing constitutional boundaries
invariably involves a policy-making function. If that is not the case,
then perhaps the only rationale for Berger's distinction is that of a
mechanistic jurisprudence as deployed by judges of another generation
who insisted that they were following the Constitution and not Herbert
Spencer.
Representative John A. Bingham noted during the congressional
debates that the courts had "settled" the meaning of due process long
ago.69 The Ohioan was only partly correct: the courts had immersed
themselves in considerations of due process for some time, but their
decisions were hardly settled.70 As a congressman in the late 1850s,
Bingham was himself one who had heaped scorn on Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney's bold substantive gloss on due process in the Dred
Scott case. In the three decades before the Fourteenth Amendment,
state judiciaries wrestled mightily with a variety of implications for the
centuries-old concept. The best that can be said of their efforts is that
they left-as courts usually do-several streams of precedent for later
judges to use. Bingham, then, was partially correct in appreciating the
judicial role. And that role remained vital for the future-from the
utilization of due process as a handmaiden for entrepreneurial liberty
68. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
69. GLOBE, supra note 47. at, 108-9.
70. See generaly Corwin, MThe Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24
HARV. L. REv. 366 (1911); Howe, The Meaning of 'Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CAL. L. REV. 583 (1930). For a a3iscussion of the
judicial role as it pertains to due process, see GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 193-220 (ch.
11). Berger offers extensive arguments that the concept of due process in 1789 and 1866 did
not comprehend a role for judicial review of legislative policy. The disclaimers he cites are
all too often self-serving, as for example, Alexander Hamilton's statement to New York
legislators that due process had only procedural application. Id at 194. Much more sensi-
tive to contemporary settings and subtleties is Wallace Mendelson's observation that due
process was one of those terms "designed to have the chameleon capacity to change their
color with changing moods and circumstances," W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND
FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT viii (1961).
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to its application by the Warren Court to matters of criminal justice. In
short, judges, however lacking prescriptive warrants as Berger con-
tends,7' would continue to search for new parameters of due process.
Their limitations, however, have been obvious: they can so act only so
long as society tolerates the search for new values and standards for
itself and for its law.
What does Raoul Berger want? "An end," he urges in conclusion,
"to pretence." 72 Either the judiciary should return to what he inter-
prets as the original intention underlying the Fourteenth Amendment,
or it should frankly avow its actions as judicial policymaking.7 3 A total
rollback of recent decisions involving desegregation and reapportion-
ment is unlikely, as he acknowledges.7" As an alternative, however,
Berger calls for submission of Court-wrought constitutional amend-
ments to the people so as to legitimate "government by judiciary."
This is his message. As such, it hardly merits this microscopic exami-
nation of his limited, selected evidence and his unrelenting, ungracious
treatment of other writers.
Berger's work only begs the question of how and why the present
situation developed. His tone suggests that the judges have engaged in
self-conscious aggrandizement, motivated by contempt for the wishes
of the sovereign people. He almost suggests a conspiracy of profession-
als and intellectuals. There may be more valid understanding of the
judicial function if we recognize that judicial policymaking generally
fills a vacuum created when politically accountable legislators, execu-
tives, and bureaucrats abdicate their proper policy roles.7 5
The persistence of segregation and malapportionment in post-
World War II America are examples of grievous injustices to which the
political institutions could not or would not respond. It is a matter of
perception and response. Berger maintains that the Brown decision
"did not and still does not represent the 'sense of the community'. '7 6
There is evidence, however, that the nation, including many Southern
communities, realized the educational deprivation and financial burden
inherent in segregation. The actions of a federal judge in taking over a
71. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 193-220 (ch. 11).
72. Id at 418.
73. Berger urges: "If government by judiciary is necessary to preserve the spirit of our
democracy, let it be submitted in plainspoken fashion to the people-the ultimate sover-
eign-for their approval." Id
74. Id at 412-13.
75. See Mendelson, The Politics of Judicial Activism, 24 EMORY L.J. 43, 44 (1975).
76. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 328.
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school system77 probably run counter to a "national consensus," but
that is not the same as condemning the ideals and values of the 1954
decision. Archibald Cox, himself somewhat leery of recent judicial ac-
tivism, nevertheless remarked: "To have adhered to the doctrine of
'separate but equal' would have ignored not only the revolution sweep-
ing the world but the moral sense of civilization.""8 Professor Cox also
noted: "[T]hese impulses were not shared so strongly and widely as to
realize themselves through legislation."79 With blithe certitude, Berger
sees such controversies simply as problems of "evil that the people
were, and remain, unready to cure."8" What an exquisite expression of
majoritarianism-but also misguided and beside the point. For one so
steeped in the wisdom of the Founding Fathers, Berger appears oblivi-
ous to their concerns about legislative tyranny and majoritarianism.
Moreover, the persistence of segregation and malapportionment simply
defied the theory of The Federalist No. 10 with its recognition of minor-
ity rights and the bargained functioning of the political process.8 '
Conclusion
The lamentable-fact is that our political system has often malfunc-
tioned when entrenched interests confront rising demands for change.
What "people" had a legislative opportunity to "cure" the encrusted,
vested practices of segregation and malapportionment? Certainly, all-
white Southern legislatures (by design, not by chance) and malappor-
tioned legislatures (again by design) offered no opportunity or even
prospect for change. Government by judiciary is indeed fraught with
dangers of tyranny, but we are similarly threatened when legislatures
are unrepresentative and unresponsive. "I'll be dammed if I'll vote my-
self out," one Maryland legislator said in 1962 in response to a move
for reapportionment.8 " How then do we implement the principle that
redress of grievances lies at the polls, not in the courts?
Consider also the problem of mental institutions in Alabama in
77. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
78. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 110
(1976).
79. Id at 35.
80. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 409.
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). There is, of course, an
enormous body of commentary on the political philosophy of the FEDERALIST PAPERS. No
serious claims for majoritarianism have been put forth for the views of Madison, Hamilton,
or Jay. Martin Diamond's essay is one of the most perceptive, particularly with his conten-
tion that these men were not "value-free social scientists." See M. Diamond, Democracy and
the Federalist, A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent, AM. POL. Sci. REv. 53 (1959).
82. R. HANSON, THE POLITICAL THICKET 18 (1966).
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the 1970s. The grisly fact-finding that can be read in Wyatt v.
Aderholt8 3 reflects legislative, executive, and bureaucratic neglect at its
worst. These governmental institutions chose to ignore the understaf-
fing, the denial of treatment, and the sheer brutality in state mental
hospitals. Worse, they denied or downplayed the very existence of such
conditions. Judge Frank Johnson's intervention and orders, however,
effectively provided an impetus for the state to carry out its responsibil-
ities; the prescribed processes for correction were simply inert. 4 And,
once again, it is not necessarily a fair deduction that prevailing condi-
tions reflected the will of the "ultimate sovereign"-the people.
Admittedly, Berger has a valid point about resort to the article V
amendment process as the proper means to change the constitutional
framework. But the path for amendment, like that of legislation is
often blocked by inertia or irresponsibility. It seems unreasonable to
have expected the malapportioned Congress and state legislatures to
provide an amendment mandating reapportionment or desegregation.
Moreover, there are problems of adjustment and change which have
been effectively and responsibly handled by the judiciary on a case-by-
case basis, rather than through the larger, more cumbersome, instru-
ment of an amendment. Certainly there are limits to judicial wisdom
and to the idea of committing broad policymaking power to judges. As
such, we need not deviate from the post-1937 prescriptions: judges
should presume the constitutionality of legislative policy but they
should apply severe scrutiny to legislation affecting processes of free
political discourse, association, or balloting, which are the foundation
for making substantive legislative and executive policy choices.8 5
Experience has demonstrated that by such action, judges have
prompted, even forced, legislatures and executives to deal with
problems they would rather ignore. That result admittedly violates
Berger's notions of constitutional purity and somewhat confirms his
concept of judicial policymaking, but how else should judges respond
to injustice, as they perceive it? Sadly enough, our political institutions
and society have come to expect-and probably accept--such a judicial
role. Witness the public approval of the process and conclusion of
United States v. Nixon. 6
The role of our judiciary in a democratic society is a perplexing
one, constantly in need of new accommodations. But there is little con-
83. 503 F.2d 1305 (1974).
84. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Ala. (1972).
85. See note 15 and text accompanying note 17 supra.
86. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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tribution to that search for accommodation when Berger uses a
Toynbee-like-and fallacious-analogy between the workings of the
American judiciary and the Weimar Republic, Hitlerism, and Stalin-
ism. s7 Such urgent, hortative tones as he uses in Government By Judii-
ary simply are no substitute for a sensitive appreciation of either our
institutional dilemma or our political and social realities.
87. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 410, 412.
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